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Abstract
We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions
but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication
mechanism consisting in reporting the deviator when seeing it and propagating this information
is sufficient for characterizing Nash equilibria. We propose an epistemic game construction, which
conveniently records important information about the knowledge of the players. With this abstraction,
we are able to characterize Nash equilibria which follow the simple communication pattern via
winning strategies. We finally discuss the size of the construction, which would allow efficient
algorithmic solutions to compute Nash equilibria in the original game.
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1 Introduction
Multiplayer concurrent games over graphs allow to model rich interactions between players.
Those games are played as follows. In a state, each player chooses privately and independently
an action, defining globally a move (one action per player); the next state of the game is
then defined as the successor (on the graph) of the current state using that move; players
continue playing from that new state, and form a(n infinite) play. Each player then gets
a reward given by a payoff function (one function per player). In particular, objectives of
the players may not be contradictory: those games are non-zero-sum games, contrary to
two-player games used for controllers or reactive synthesis [16, 12].
Using solution concepts borrowed from game theory, one can describe interactions among
the players, and in particular rational behaviours of selfish players. One of the most basic and
classically studied solution concepts is that of Nash equilibria [13]. A Nash equilibrium is a
strategy profile where no player can improve her payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy.
The outcome of a Nash equilibrium can therefore be seen as a rational behaviour of the
system. While very much studied by game theorists, e.g. over (repeated) matrix games, such
a concept (and variants thereof) has been only rather recently studied over infinite-duration
games on graphs. Probably the first works in that direction are [9, 8, 17, 18]. Several series
of works have followed. To roughly give an idea of the existing results, pure Nash equilibria
always exist in turn-based games for ω-regular objectives [20] but not in concurrent games,
even with simple objectives; they can nevertheless be computed [20, 4, 7, 3] for large classes
of objectives. The problem becomes harder with mixed (that is, stochastic) Nash equilibria,
for which we often cannot decide the existence [19, 5].
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Computing Nash equilibria requires to (i) find a good behaviour of the system; (ii) detect
deviations from that behaviour, and identify deviating players; (iii) punish them. This simple
characterization of Nash equilibria is made explicit in [10]. Variants of Nash equilibria require
slightly different ingredients, but they are mostly of a similar vein.
Many of those results are proven using the construction of a two-player game, in which
winning strategies correspond (in some precise sense) to Nash equilibria in the original game.
This two-player game basically records the knowledge of the various players about everything
which can be uncertain: (a) the possible deviators in [4], and (b) the possible states the
game can be in [3]. Extensions of this construction can be used for other solution concepts
like robust equilibria [7] or rational synthesis [11].
In this work, we consider infinite-duration games on graphs, in which the game arena is
perfectly known by all the players, but players have only a partial information on the actions
played by the other players.
The partial-information setting of this work is inspired by [15]: it considers repeated
games played on matrices, where players only see actions of their neighbours. Neighbours are
specified by a communication graph. To ensure a correct detection of deviators, the solution
is to propagate the identity of the deviator along the communication graph. A fingerprint
(finite sequence of actions) of every player is agreed at the beginning, and the propagation
can be made properly if and only if the communication graph is 2-connected, ensuring large
sets of Nash equilibria (formalized as a folk theorem). Fingerprints are not adapted to the
setting of graphs, since they may delay the time at which a player will learn the identity of
the deviator, which may be prohibitive if a bad component of a graph is then reached.
We therefore propose to add real communication among players. Similarly to [15], a
player can communicate only with her neighbours (also specified by a communication graph),
but can send arbitrary messages (modelled as arbitrary words over alphabet {0, 1}). We
assume that visited states are known by the players, hence only the deviator (if any) may be
unknown to the players. In this setting, we show the following results:
We show that a very simple epidemic-like communication mechanism is sufficient for
defining Nash equilibria. It consists in (a) reporting the deviator (for the neighbours
of the deviator) as soon as it is detected, and (b) propagating this information (for the
other players).
We build an epistemic game, which tracks those strategy profiles which follow the above
simple communication pattern. This is a two-player turn-based game, in which Eve (the
first player) suggest moves, and Adam (the second player) complies (to generate the main
outcome), or not (to mimic single-player deviations). The correctness of the construction
is formulated as follows: there is a Nash equilibrium in the original game of payoff p if
and only if there is a strategy for Eve in the epistemic game which is winning for p.
We analyze the complexity of this construction.
Note that we do not assume connectedness of the communication graph, hence the
particular case of a graph with no edges allows to recover the setting of [4] while a complete
graph allows to recover the settings of [20, 7].
In Section 2, we define our model and give an example to illustrate the role of the
communication graph. In Section 3, we prove the simple communication pattern. In
Section 4, we construct the epistemic game and discuss its correctness. In Section 5, we
discuss complexity issues. All proofs are postponed to the technical appendix.
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2 Definitions
We use the standard notations R (resp. Q, N) for the set of real (resp. rational, natural)
numbers. If S is a subset of R, we write S for S ∪ {−∞,+∞}.
Let S be a finite set and R ⊆ S. If m is an S-vector over some set Σ, we write m(R) (resp.
m(−R)) for the vector composed of the R-components of m (resp. all but the R-components).
We also use abusively the notations m(i) (resp. m(−i)) when i is a single element of S, and
may sometimes even use mi if this is clear in the context. Also, if s ∈ S and a ∈ Σ, then
m[s/a] is the vector where the value m(s) is replaced by a.
If S is a finite set, we write S∗ (resp. S+, Sω) for the set of words (resp. non-empty
word, infinite words) defined on alphabet S.
2.1 Concurrent games and communication graphs
We use the model of concurrent multi-player games [4], based on the two-player model of [1].
I Definition 1. A concurrent multiplayer game is a tuple G = 〈V, vinit,Act, P ,Σ,Allow,
Tab, (payoffa)a∈P 〉, where V is a finite set of vertices, vinit ∈ V is the initial vertex, Act is
a finite set of actions, P is a finite set of players, Σ is a finite alphabet, Allow : V × P →
2Act \ {∅} is a mapping indicating the actions available to a given player in a given vertex,1
Tab : V ×ActP → V associates, with a given vertex and a given action tuple the target vertex,
for every a ∈ P , payoffa : V ω → D is a payoff function with values in a domain D ⊆ R.
An element of ActP is called a move. Standardly (see [1] for two-player games and [4]
for the multiplayer extension), concurrent games are played as follows: from a given vertex
v, each player selects independently an action (allowed by Allow), which altogether form a
move m; then, the game proceeds to the next vertex, given by Tab(v,m); the game continues
from that new vertex.
Our setting will refine this model, in that at each round, each player will also broadcast
a message, which will be received by some of the players. The players that can receive a
message will be specified using a communication graph that we will introduce later. The role
of the messages will remain unclear until we commit to the definition of a strategy.
Formally, a full history h in G is a finite sequence
v0 · (m0,mes0) · v1 · (m1,mes1) · v2 . . . (ms−1,mess−1) · vs ∈ V ·
((
ActP × ({0, 1}∗)P) · V )∗
such that for every 0 ≤ r < s, for every a ∈ P , mr(a) ∈ Allow(vr, a), and vr+1 = Tab(vr,mr).
For every 0 ≤ r < s, for every a ∈ P , the set mesr(a) is the message appended to action
mr(a) at step r + 1, which will be broadcast to some other players. For readability we will
also write h as
v0
m0,mes0−−−−−→ v1 m1,mes1−−−−−→ v2 . . . ms−1,mess−1−−−−−−−−→ vs
We write vertices(h) = v0·v1 · · · vs, and last(h) for the last vertex of h (that is, vs). If r ≤ s, we
also write h≥r (resp. h≤r) for the suffix vr·(mr,mesr)·vr+1·(mr+1,mesr+1) . . . (ms−1,mess−1)·
vs (resp. prefix v0 · (m0,mes0) · v1 · (m1,mes1) . . . (mr−1,mesr−1) · vr). We write HistG(v0)
(or simply Hist(v0) if G is clear in the context) for the set of full histories in G that start at
v0. If h ∈ Hist(v0) and h′ ∈ Hist(last(h)), then we write h · h′ for the obvious concatenation
of histories (it then belongs to Hist(v0)).
1 This condition ensures that the game is non-blocking.
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We add a communication (directed) graph G = (P , E) to the context. The set of vertices
of G is the set of players, and edges define a neighbourhood relation. An edge (a, b) ∈ E
(with a 6= b) means that player b can see which actions are played by player a together with
the messages broadcast by player a. Later we write a_b whenever (a, b) ∈ E or a = b, and
n(b) = {a ∈ P | a_b} for the so-called neighbourhood of b (that is, the set of players about
which player b has information). If a, b ∈ P , we write distG(a, b) for the distance in G from a
to b (+∞ if there is no path from a to b).
Let a ∈ P be a player. The projection of h for a is denoted pia(h) and is defined by
v0 · (m0(n(a)),mes0(n(a))) · v1 · (m1(n(a)),mes1(n(a))) · v2 . . .
. . . (ms−1(n(a)),mess−1(n(a))) · vs ∈ V ·
((
Actn(a) × ({0, 1}∗)n(a)
)
· V
)∗
This will be the information available to player a. In particular, messages broadcast by
the players are part of this information. Note that we assume perfect recall, that is, while
playing, player a will remember all her past knowledge, that is, all of pia(h) if h has been
played so far. We define the undistinguishability relation ∼a as the equivalence relation over
full histories induced by pia: for two histories h and h′, h ∼a h′ iff pia(h) = pia(h′). While
playing, if h ∼a h′, a will not be able to know whether h or h′ has been played. We write
HistG,a(v0) for the set of histories for player a (also called a-histories) from v0.
We extend all the above notions to infinite sequences in a straightforward way and to the
notion of full play. We write PlaysG(v0) (or simply Plays(v0) if G is clear in the context) for
the set of full plays in G that start at v0.
A strategy for a player a ∈ P from vertex v0 is a mapping σa : HistG(v0)→ Act× {0, 1}∗
such that for every history h ∈ HistG(v0), σa(h)[1] ∈ Allow(last(h), a), where the notation
σa(h)[1] denotes the first component of the pair σ(h). The value σa(h)[1] represents the
action that player a will do after h, while σa(h)[2] is the message that she will append to her
action and broadcast to all players b such that a_b. The strategy σa is said G-compatible
if furthermore, for all histories h, h′ ∈ Hist(v0), h ∼a h′ implies σa(h) = σa(h′). In that
case, σa can equivalently be seen as a mapping HistG,a(v0) → Act × {0, 1}∗. An outcome
of σa is a(n infinite) play ρ = v0 · (m0,mes0) · v1 · (m1,mes1) . . . such that for every r ≥ 0,
σa(ρ≤r) = (mr(a),mesr(a)). We write out(σa, v0) for the set of outcomes of σa from v0.
A strategy profile is a tuple σP = (σa)a∈P , where, for every player a ∈ P , σa is a strategy
for player a. The strategy profile is said G-compatible whenever each σa is G-compatible.
We write out(σP , v0) for the unique full play from v0, which is an outcome of all strategies
part of σP .
When σP is a strategy profile and σ′d a player-d G-compatible strategy, we write σP [d/σ′d]
for the profile where player d plays according to σ′d, and each other player a ( 6= d) plays
according to σa. The strategy σ′d is a deviation of player d, or a d-deviation w.r.t. σP .
Such a d-deviation is said profitable w.r.t. σP whenever payoffd
(
vertices(out(σP , v0))
)
<
payoffd
(
vertices(out(σP [d/σ′d], v0))
)
.
I Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium from v0 is a G-compatible strategy profile σP such that
for every d ∈ P , there is no profitable d-deviation w.r.t. σP .
In this definition, deviation σ′d needs not really to be G-compatible, since the only meaningful
part of σ′d is along out(σ[d/σ′d], v0), where there are no ∼d-equivalent histories: any deviation
can be made G-compatible without affecting the profitability of the resulting outcome.
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Figure 1 A five-player game (left) and three communication graphs (right); self-loops a_a
omitted from the picture. The action alphabet is {α, β}. The transition function is represented as
arrows from one vertex to another labeled with the action profile(s) allowing to go from the origin
vertex to the destination one. We write action profiles with length-5 words. Convention: no label
means complementary labels (e.g. one goes from v0 to v′0 using any action profile that is not in
α5 + (αβ + ββ + βα)Act3 + α2(βα2 + αβα+ α2β)).
I Remark 3. Before pursuing our study, let us make clear what information players have: a
player knows the full arena of the game and the whole communication graph; when playing
the game, a player sees the states which are visited, and see actions of and messages from her
neighbours (in the communication graph). When playing the profile of a Nash equilibrium,
all players know all strategies, hence a player knows precisely what is expected to be the
main outcome; in particular, when the play leaves the main outcome, each player knows that
a deviation has occurred, even though she didn’t see the deviator or received any message.
Note that deviations which do not leave the main outcome may occur; in this case, only the
neighbours of the deviator will know that such a deviation occurred; we will see that it is
useless to take care of such deviations.
2.2 An example
We consider the five-player game described in Figure 1 in which we denote the players
P = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The action alphabet is Act = {α, β}, and the initial vertex is assumed to
be v0. We suppose the payoff function vector is defined as (to be read as the list of payoffs
of the players):
payoff(ρ) =

(0, 0, 1, 1, 1) if ρ visits v1 infinitely often
(0, 0, 2, 2, 2) if ρ visits v1 finitely often and v′1 infinitely often
(0, 0, 0, 2, 2) if ρ ends up in v2
(0, 0, 2, 0, 2) if ρ ends up in v3
(0, 0, 2, 2, 0) if ρ ends up in v4
(0, 0, 3, 3, 3) if ρ ends up in v′0
We consider a (partial) strategy profile σ whose main outcome is:
ρ =
(
v0 · (α5,mes) · v1 · (α5,mes)
)ω
where mes(a) =  for every a ∈ P . Note that players 0 and 1 cannot benefit from any
deviation since their payoffs is uniformly 0. Then notice that no one alone can deviate from
MFCS 2019
14:6 Nash equilibria in games over graphs equipped with a communication mechanism
ρ to v′0. Now, the three players 2, 3 and 4 can alone deviate to v′1 and (try to) do so infinitely
often. We examine those deviations. If players 0 and 1 manage to learn who is the deviator,
then, together, they can punish the deviator: if they learn that player 2 (resp. 3, 4) is the
deviator, then they will enforce vertex v2 (resp. v3, v4). If they do not manage to learn who
is the deviator, then they will not know what to do, and therefore, in any completion of the
strategy profile, there will be some profitable deviation for at least one of the players (hence
there will not be any Nash equilibrium whose main outcome is ρ).
We examine now the three communication graphs G1, G2 and G3 depicted in Figure 1.
Using communication based on graph G1, if player 4 deviates, then player 0 will see this
immediately and will be able to communicate this fact to player 1; if player 3 deviates, then
player 4 will see this immediately and will be able to communicate this fact to player 0,
which will transmit to player 1; if player 2 deviates, then no one will see anything, hence
they will deduce the identity of the deviator in all the cases.
Using communication based on graph G2, if either player 3 or player 4 deviates, then
player 0 will see this immediately and will be able to communicate this fact to player 1 using
the richness of the communication scheme (words over {0, 1}). Like before, the identity of
deviator 2 will be guessed after a while.
Using communication based on graph G3, if player 4 deviates, then player 0 will see this
immediately and will be able to communicate this fact to player 1 (as before); now, no one
(except players 2 and 3) will be able to learn who is deviating, if player 2 or player 3 deviates.
We can conclude that there is a Nash equilibrium with graph G1 or G2 whose main
outcome is ρ, but not with graph G3.
2.3 Two-player turn-based game structures
Two-player turn-based game structures are specific cases of the previous model, where at
each vertex, at most one player has more than one action in her set of allowed actions. But
for convenience, we will give a simplified definition, with only objects that will be useful.
A two-player turn-based game structure is a tuple G = 〈S, SEve, SAdam, sinit, A,Allow,Tab〉,
where S = SEve unionsq SAdam is a finite set of states (states in SEve belong to player Eve whereas
states in SAdam belong to player Adam), sinit ∈ S is the initial state, A is a finite alphabet,
Allow : S → 2A \ {∅} gives the set of available actions, and Tab : S ×A→ S is the next-state
function. If s ∈ SEve (resp. SAdam), Allow(s) is the set of actions allowed to Eve (resp. Adam)
in state s.
In this context, strategies will use sequences of states. That is, if a denotes Eve or Adam,
an a-strategy is a partial function σa : S∗ · Sa → A such that for every H ∈ S∗ · Sa such
that σa(H) is defined, σa(H) ∈ Allow(last(H)). Note that we do not include any winning
condition or payoff function in the tuple, hence the name structure.
2.4 The problems we are looking at
We are interested in the constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium. For simplicity, we
define rectangular threshold constraints, but could well impose more complex constraints,
like Boolean combinations of linear constraints.
B Problem 1 (Constrained existence problem). Given a concurrent game G =
〈V, vinit, P ,Act,Σ,Allow,Tab, (payoffa)a∈P 〉, a communication graph G for P , a predicate P
over R|P |, can we decide whether there exists a Nash equilibrium σP from vinit such that
payoff(vertices(out(σP , vinit))) ∈ P? If so, compute one. If the predicate P is trivial, we
simply speak of the existence problem.
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The case where the communication graph has no edge was studied in depth in [4], with
a generic two-player construction called the suspect construction, allowing to decide the
constrained existence problem for many kinds of payoff functions. The case where the
communication graph is a clique was the subject of the work [7]. The general case of a
communication graph has not been investigated so far, but induces interesting developments.
In the next section, we show that we can restrict the search of Nash equilibria to the search
of so-called normed strategy profiles, where the communication via messages follows a very
simple pattern. We also argue that deviations which do not impact the visited vertices should
not be considered in the analysis. Given those reductions, we then propose the construction
of a two-player game, which will track those normed profiles. This construction is inspired
by the suspect-game construction of [4] and of the epistemic game of [3].
3 Reduction to profiles following a simple communication mechanism
We fix a concurrent game G = 〈V, vinit,Act, P ,Σ,Allow,Tab, (payoffa)a∈P 〉 and a communica-
tion graph G. We assume that vinit = v0. We will reduce the search for Nash equilibria to
the search for strategy profiles with a very specific shape. In particular, we will show that
the richness of the communication offered by the setting is somehow useless, and that a very
simple communication pattern will be sufficient for characterizing Nash equilibria.
In the following, we write mes for the vector assigning the empty word  to every player
a ∈ P . Furthermore, for every d ∈ P , we pick some word idd ∈ {0, 1}+ which are all distinct
(and different from ).
We first define restrictions for deviations. Let σP be a strategy profile. A player-d
deviation σ′d is said immediately visible whenever, writing h for the longest common prefix
of out(σP , v0) and out(σP [d/σ′d], v0), Tab(last(h),m) 6= Tab(last(h),m′), where m = σP (h)[1]
and m′ =
(
σP [d/σ′d](h)
)
[1] are the next moves according to σP and σP [d/σ′d]. That is, at
the first position where player d changes her strategy, it becomes public information that a
deviation has occurred (even though some players know who deviated —all the players a
with d_a—, and some other don’t know). It is furthermore called honest whenever for every
h′ ∈ out(σP [d/σ′d], v0) such that h is a (non-strict) prefix of h′, σ′d(h′)[2] = idd. Somehow,
player d admits she deviated, and does so immediately and forever.
The simple communication mechanism that we will design consists in reporting the
deviator (role of the direct neighbours of the deviator), and propagating this information
along the communication graph (for all the other players). Formally, let σP be a strategy
profile, and let ρ be its main outcome. The profile σP will be said normed whenever the
following conditions hold:
1. for every h ∈ out(σP ) ∪
⋃
d∈P , σ′
d
out(σP [d/σ′d], v0), if vertices(h) is a prefix of vertices(ρ),
then for every a ∈ P , σa(h)[2] = ;
2. for every d ∈ P , for every d-strategy σ′d, if h · (m,mes) · v ∈ out(σP [d/σ′d], v0) is the first
step out of vertices(ρ), then for every d_a, σa(h · (m,mes) · v)[2] = idd;
3. for every d ∈ P , for every d-strategy σ′d, if h · (m,mes) · v ∈ out(σP [d/σ′d], v0) has left the
main outcome for more than one step, then for every a ∈ P , σa(h · (m,mes) · v)[2] = 
if for all b_a, mes(b) =  and σa(h · (m,mes) · v)[2] = idd if there is b_a such that
mes(b) = idd; note that this is well defined since at most one id can be transmitted.
The first condition says that, as long as a deviation is not visible, then no message needs to
be sent; the second condition says that as soon as a deviation becomes visible, then messages
denouncing the deviator should be sent by “those who know”, that is, the (immediate)
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neighbours of the deviator; the third condition says that the name (actually, the id) of the
deviator should propagate according to the communication graph in an epidemic way.
Note that the profiles discussed in Section 2.2 were actually normed.
I Theorem 4. The existence of a Nash equilibrium σP with payoff p is equivalent to the
existence of a normed strategy profile σ′P with payoff p, which is resistant to immediately
visible and honest single-player deviations.
The proof of this theorem is rather technical, hence postponed to Appendix A, page 14.
We only give some intuition here. First, we explain why being resistant to immediately visible
and honest deviations is enough. Notice that as long as the sequence of vertices follows the
main outcome, then one can simply ignore the deviation and act only when the deviation
becomes visible, in a way as if the deviator had started deviating only at this moment. This
will be enough to punish the deviator. The “honest” part comes from the fact that one
should simply ignore the messages sent by the deviator as it can be only in her interest to
not ignore them (if it was not, then why would she send any message at all?).
Second, we show why no one should communicate as long as the sequence of vertices
follows the main outcome. The reason is that if no one has deviated then any message is
essentially useless, and if a deviation has happened, as explained earlier it can just be ignored
as long as it has not become visible.
Finally, we demonstrate why the richness of the communication mechanism is in a way
useless. Intuitively, one can understand that the only factors that should matter when playing
are the sequence of the vertices that have been visited (because payoff functions only take
into account the visited vertices) and the identity of the deviator. Thus the messages should
only be used so that players can know of the identity of the deviator in the fastest possible
way, and we show that nothing is faster than a sort of epidemic mechanism where one simply
broadcasts the identity of the deviator whenever one received the information.
4 The epistemic game abstraction
We fix a concurrent game G = 〈V, vinit,Act, P ,Σ,Allow,Tab, (payoffa)a∈P 〉 for the rest of the
section, and G be a communication graph for P . We will implement an epistemic abstraction,
which will track normed strategy profiles, and check that there is no profitable immediately
visible and honest single-player deviations.
4.1 Description of the epistemic game
A situation is a triple (d, I,K) in P × 2P ×
(
2P
)P
, which consists of a deviator d ∈ P , a list
of players I having received the information that d is the deviator, and a knowledge function
K that associates to every player a a list of suspects K(a); in particular, it should be the
case that d ∈ I and for every a ∈ I, K(a) = {d}. We write Sit for the set of situations.
The epistemic game EGG of G and G is defined as a two-player game structure 〈S, SEve,
SAdam, sinit,Σ′,Allow′,Tab′〉. We describe the states and the transitions leaving those states;
in particular, components Σ′, Allow′, Tab′ of the above tuple will only be implicitely defined.
Eve’s states SEve consist of elements of V × 2Sit such that if (v,X) is a state then for all
a ∈ P the set {(d, I,K) ∈ X | d = a} is either a singleton or empty (there is at most one
situation associated with a given player a). We write dev(X) the set {d ∈ P | ∃(d, I,K) ∈ X}
of agents which are a deviator in one situation of X. If d ∈ dev(X), we write (d, IXd ,KXd ) for
the unique triple belonging to X having deviator d. Hence, X = {(d, IXd ,KXd ) | d ∈ dev(X)}.
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Intuitively, an Eve’s state (v,X) will correspond to a situation where the game has proceeded
to vertex v, but, if dev(X) 6= ∅, several players may have deviated. Each player d ∈ dev(X)
may be responsible for the deviation; some people will have received a message denouncing d
(those are in the set IXd ), and some will deduce things from what they observe (this is given
by KXd ). Note that the (un)distinguishability relation of a player a will be deduced from X:
if d deviated and a ∈ IXd , then a will know d deviated; if a is neither in IXd nor in IXd′ , then
a will not be able to know whether d or d′ deviated (as we will prove later, in Lemma 5).
First let us consider the case where X = ∅, which is to be understood as the case where
no deviation has arisen yet. In state (v, ∅), Eve’s actions are moves in G enabled in v. When
she plays move m ∈ ActP , the game progresses to Adam’s state ((v, ∅),m) ∈ SAdam where
Adam’s actions are vertices v′ ∈ V such that there exists a player d ∈ P and an action δ ∈ Act
such that Tab(v, (m[d/δ])) = v′. When Adam plays v′, either v′ = Tab(v,m) and the game
progresses to Eve’s state (v′, ∅) or v′ 6= Tab(v,m) and the game progresses to Eve’s state
(v′, X ′) where:
d ∈ dev(X ′) if and only if there is δ ∈ Act such that Tab(v, (m[d/δ])) = v′. It means that
given the next state v′, d is a possible deviator;
if d ∈ dev(X ′), then:
IX
′
d = {a ∈ P | d_a};
for every a ∈ IX′d , KX
′
d (a) = {d};
for every a /∈ IX′d , KX
′
d (a) = {b ∈ P | ∃β ∈ Act s.t. Tab(v, (m[b/β])) = v′} \ {b ∈ P |
b_a}. Those are all the players that can be suspected by a, given the vertex v′, and
the absence of messages so far.
We write X ′ = upd((v, ∅),m, v′). Note that X ′ = ∅ whenever (and only when) Tab(v,m) = v′.
In a state (v,X) ∈ SEve where X 6= ∅, Eve’s actions consist of functions from dev(X) to
ActP that are compatible with players’ knowledge, that is: f : dev(X)→ ActP is an action
enabled in (v,X) if and only if (i) for all d ∈ dev(X), for each a ∈ P , f(d)(a) ∈ Allow(v, a),
(ii) for all d, d′ ∈ dev(X), for all a ∈ P , if a /∈ IXd ∪ IXd′ and KXd (a) = KXd′ (a) then
f(d)(a) = f(d′)(a);2 that is, if a player has not received any message so far but has the
same knowledge about the possible deviators in two situations, then Eve’s suggestion for
that player’s action must be the same in both situations. When Eve plays action f in (v,X),
the next state is ((v,X), f) ∈ SAdam, where Adam’s actions correspond to states of the game
that are compatible with (v,X) and f , that is states v′ such that there exists d ∈ dev(X)
and δ ∈ Act such that Tab(v, f(d)[d/δ]) = v′.
When Adam chooses the action v′ in ((v,X), f), the game progresses to Eve’s state (v′, X ′),
where:
d ∈ dev(X ′) if and only if d ∈ dev(X) and there exists δ ∈ Act such that Tab(v, f(d)[d/δ]) =
v′. It corresponds to a case where d was already a possible deviator and can continue
deviating so that the game goes to v′;
if d ∈ dev(X ′), then:
IX
′
d = IXd ∪ {a ∈ P | ∃b ∈ IXd s.t. b_a}. New players receive a message with the
deviator id;
for every a ∈ IX′d , KX
′
d (a) = {d};
2 Note in particular that “KXd (a) singleton” does not imply a ∈ IXd , those are two distinguishable
situations: the message with the identity of the deviator may not have been received in the first case,
while it has been received in the second case.
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v0, ∅ v0, ∅
α5
v1, ∅
v′1, X
Eve Adam
Eve
Eve
α5
v1
v′1
0
1
2
4
3
G1
X =

(2, {2}, {0 7→ {2, 3}, 1 7→ {2, 3, 4}, 3 7→ {2, 4}, 4 7→ {2}}),
(3, {3, 4}, {0 7→ {2, 3}, 1 7→ {2, 3, 4}, 2 7→ {3, 4}}),
(4, {0, 4}, {1 7→ {2, 3, 4}, 2 7→ {3, 4}, 3 7→ {2, 4}})

Figure 2 Part of the epistemic game corresponding to the game described in Figure 1 (with
graph G1). This does not represent the whole epistemic game and a lot of actions accessible in the
states we show here are not written. In situations (d, I,K) we describe K by the list of its values
for players a /∈ I, as for all a in I we have K(a) = {d} by definition.
for every a /∈ IX′d , KX
′
d (a) = {b ∈ KXd (a) | ∃β ∈ Act s.t. Tab(v, f(b)[b/β]) = v′} \ {c ∈
P | distG(c, a) ≤ max{distG(c, c′) | c′ ∈ IXc } + 1}. Those are the players that could
have deviated but for which player a would not have received the signal yet.
We write X ′ = upd((v,X), f, v′). Note that X ′ 6= ∅ and that dev(X ′) ⊆ dev(X).
We let R = (v0, X0) ·((v0, X0), f0) ·(v1, X1) . . . be an infinite play from (v0, X0) = (vinit, ∅).
We write visited(R) for v0v1 · · · ∈ V ω the sequence of vertices visited along R. We also define
dev(R) = ∅ if Xr = ∅ for every r, and dev(R) = limr→+∞ dev(Xr) otherwise. This is the set
of possible deviators along R.
4.1.1 Winning condition of Eve.
A zero-sum game will be played on the game structure EGG , and the winning condition of
Eve will be given on the branching structure of the set of outcomes of a strategy for Eve,
and not individually on each outcome, as standardly in two-player zero-sum games. We
write sinit = (vinit, ∅) for the initial state. Let p = (pa)a∈P ∈ RP , and ζ be a strategy for Eve
in EGG ; it is said winning for p from sinit whenever payoff(visited(R)) = p, where R is the
unique outcome of ζ from sinit where Adam complies to Eve’s suggestions, and for every other
outcome R′ of ζ, for every d ∈ dev(R′), payoffd(visited(R′)) ≤ pd.
4.2 An example
In Figure 2 we present a part of the epistemic game corresponding to the game we described in
Figure 1 with graph G1. In state (v0, ∅), Eve can play the action profile α5 and make the game
go to ((v0, ∅), α5) where Adam can either play v1 = Tab(v0, α5) (we say that Adam complies with
Eve) or choose a different state accessible from v0 and an action profile that consists in a single-
player deviation from α, for instance v′1 = Tab(v0, α2βα2) = Tab(v0, α3βα) = Tab(v0, α4β).
If Adam chooses v′1, then three players are possible deviators: 2, 3 and 4. We write X for the
corresponding set of situations, and we already know that dev(X) = {2, 3, 4} .
If player 2 is the deviator, then no one (except himself) directly receives this information.
Player 0 knows that player 4 did not deviate (since 4_0 in G1), hence KX2 (0) = {2, 3};
Player 1 has no information hence KX2 (1) = {2, 3, 4}; Player 3 knows that he is not the
deviator but cannot know more, hence KX2 (3) = {2, 4}; Finally, player 4 can deduce many
things: he knows he is not the deviator, and he saw that player 3 is not the deviator
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(since 3_4 in G1), hence KX2 (4) = {2}.
If player 3 is the deviator, then both players 3 and 4 get the information, hence IX3 = {3, 4}.
Other players can guess some things, for instance player 0 sees that player 4 cannot be
the deviator, this is why KX3 (0) = {2, 3}. Etc.
The reasoning for player 4 is similar.
In the situation we have just described, when the game will proceed to v′1, then either player
0 knows that player 4 has deviated, or he knows that player 4 didn’t deviate but he suspects
both 2 and 3. On the other hand, player 4 will precisely know who deviated. And player 3
knows whether he deviated or not, but if he didn’t, then he cannot know whether it was
player 2 or player 4 who deviated. This knowledge is stored in situation X we have described,
and which is fully given in Figure 2.
Let us now illustrate how actions of Eve are defined in states with a non-empty set of
situations. Assume we are in Eve’s state (v0, X), with X as previously defined. From that
state, an action for Eve is a mapping f : {2, 3, 4} → ActP such that:
f(2)(0) = f(3)(0) f(2)(1) = f(3)(1) = f(4)(1) f(3)(2) = f(4)(2) f(2)(3) = f(4)(3)
The intuition behind these constraints is the following: Player 0 knows whether Player 4
deviated or not, but in the case she did not cannot know whether Player 2 or Player 3
deviated; Player 1 does not know who deviated, hence should play the same action in the
three cases (that she cannot distinguish); Player 2 does only know whether she deviated
hence in the case she did not cannot know whether Player 3 or Player 4 deviated; the case for
Player 3 is similar; finally Player 4 knows for sure who deviated: she saw if Player 3 deviated
and knows whether she herself deviated, thus can distinguish between the three cases.
4.3 Correctness of the epistemic game construction
When constructing the epistemic game, we mentioned that Eve’s states will allow to properly
define the undistinguishability relation for all the players. Towards that goal, we show by an
immediate induction the following result:
I Lemma 5. If (v,X) is an Eve’s state reachable from some (v0, ∅) in EGG , then for all
d ∈ dev(X):
for all a ∈ IXd , KXd (a) = {d};
for all a /∈ IXd , KXd (a) = dev(X) \ {d′ ∈ dev(X) | a ∈ IXd′ }.
In particular, for all d, d′ ∈ dev(X), for all a /∈ IXd ∪ IXd′ , KXd (a) = KXd′ (a).
So, either a player a will have received from a neighbour the identity of the deviator, or
she will not have received any deviator identity yet, and she will have a set of suspected
deviators that she will not be able to distinguish.
This allows to deduce the following correspondence between G and EGG :
I Proposition 6. There is a winning strategy for Eve in EGG for payoff p if and only if there
is a normed strategy profile in G, whose main outcome has payoff p and which is resistant to
single-player immediately visible and honest deviations.
The proof of correctness of the epistemic game then goes through the following steps,
which are detailed in Appendix B, page 19. First, given an Eve’s strategy ζ, we build a
function Eζ associating with a-histories (for every a ∈ P ) in the original game Eve’s histories
in the epistemic game such that Eve plays according to ζ along Eζ .
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Then we use this function to create a strategy profile Ω(ζ) for the original game where
the action prescribed by this profile to player a after history h corresponds in some sense to
ζ(Eζ(h))(d)(a), where d is a suspected deviator according to player a. This works because,
thanks to Lemma 5, we know that either player a knows who the deviator is, or player a has
a subset of suspect deviators and Eve’s suggestion for a (by construction of EGG ) is the same
for all those possible deviators.
Finally we prove that if ζ is a winning strategy for Eve then Ω(ζ) is both normed and
resistant to single-player immediately visible and honest deviations in G.
To prove the converse proposition we build a function Λ associating with Eve’s histories
in the epistemic game families of single-player histories in the original game. We then use
this correspondence to build a function Υ associating with normed strategy profiles Eve’s
strategies in a natural way.
Finally we prove that if σ is normed and resistant to single-player immediately visible
honest deviations, then Υ(σ) is a winning strategy for Eve.
Gathering results of Theorem 4 and of this proposition, we get the following theorem:
I Theorem 7. There is a Nash equilibrium with payoff p in G if and only if there is a
winning strategy for Eve in EGG for payoff p.
I Remark 8. Note that all the results are constructive, hence if one can synthesize a winning
strategy for Eve in EGG , then one can synthesize a correponding Nash equilibrium in G.
5 Complexity analysis
We borrow all notations of previous sections. A rough analysis of the size of the epistemic
game EGG gives an exponential bound. We will give a more precise bound, pinpointing
the part with an exponential blowup. We write diam(G) for the diameter of G, that is
diam(G) = max{distG(a, b) | distG(a, b) < +∞}.
I Lemma 9. Assuming that Tab is given explicitely in G, the number of states in the reachable
part of EGG from sinit = (vinit, ∅) is bounded by
|SEve| ≤ |V |+ |V | · |Tab|2 · (diam(G) + 2) and |SAdam| ≤ |SEve| · |Act||P |2
The number of edges is bounded by |SAdam|+ |SAdam| · |SEve|.
If |P | is assumed to be a constant of the problem, then the size of EGG is polynomial in the
size of G.
We will not detail algorithmics issues, but the winning condition of Eve in EGG is very
similar to the winning condition of Eve in the suspect-game construction of [4] (for Boolean
or ordered objectives), or in the deviator-game construction of [7] (for mean-payoff), or
in a closer context to the epistemic-game construction of [3]. Hence, when the size of the
epistemic game is polynomial, rather efficient algorithms can be designed to compute Nash
equilibria. For instance, in a setting where the size of EGG is polynomial, using a bottom-up
labelling algorithm similar to that of [2, Sect. 4.3], one obtains a polynomial space algorithm
for deciding the (constrained) existence of a Nash equilibrium when payoffs are Boolean
payoffs corresponding to parity conditions.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied multiplayer infinite-duration games over graphs, and focused on
games where players can communicate with neighbours, given by a directed graph. We have
shown that a very simple communication mechanism was sufficient to describe Nash equilibria.
This mechanism is sort of epidemic, in that if a player deviates, then his neighbours will see it
and transmit the information to their own neighbours; the information then propagates along
the communication graph. This framework encompasses two standard existing frameworks,
one where the actions are invisible (represented with a graph with no edges), and one where
all actions are visible (represented by the complete graph). We know from previous works that
in both frameworks, one can compute Nash equilibria for many kinds of payoff functions. In
this paper, we also show that we can compute Nash equilibria in this generalized framework,
by providing a reduction to a two-player game, the so-called epistemic game construction.
Winning condition in this two-player game is very similar to winning conditions encountered
in the past, yielding algorithmic solution to the computation of Nash equilibria. We have
also analyzed the size of the abstraction, which is polynomial when the number of players is
considered as a constant of the problem.
The current framework assumes messages can be appended to actions by players, allowing
a rich communication between players. The original framework of [15] did not allow additional
messages, but did encode identities of deviators by sequences of actions. This was possible
in [15] since games were repeated matrix games, but it is harder to see how we could extend
this approach and how we could encode identities of players with actions, taking into account
the graph structure. For instance, due to the graph, having too long identifiers might be
prohibitive to transmit in a short delay the identity of the deviator. Nevertheless, that could
be interesting to see if something can be done in this framework.
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A Proof of Section 3
I Theorem 4. The existence of a Nash equilibrium σP with payoff p is equivalent to the
existence of a normed strategy profile σ′P with payoff p, which is resistant to immediately
visible and honest single-player deviations.
We will divide the proof of this theorem into several parts and prove several intermediary
results.
A.1 Reduction to immediately visible and honest deviations
I Lemma 10. Assume σP is a strategy profile from v0 such that there is no profitable
single-player immediately visible honest deviation w.r.t. σP , then one can construct a Nash
equilibrium σ˜P from v0 such that (i) vertices(out(σP , v0)) = vertices(out(σ˜P , v0)); (ii) for
every h ∈ Hist(v0) such that vertices(h) is a prefix of vertices(out(σ˜P , v0)), for every a ∈ P ,
σ˜a(h)[2] = .
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Condition (ii) in the statement means somehow that no message is required along the
main outcome and along deviations that are not visible yet (in the sense that they follow the
same sequence of vertices as the main outcome).
Proof. From σP , we will build a profile σ˜P such that:
σ˜P ’s and σP ’s main outcomes visit the same sequence of vertices;
no message is broadcast by σ˜P as long as the sequence of vertices of the main outcome is
followed;
any single-player d-deviation of σ˜P will correspond to an immediately visible single-player
honest d-deviation of σP .
Let ρ = out(σP , vo). For every h ∈ Hist(v0) such that vertices(h) = vertices(ρ≤r) for some
r, for every a ∈ P , we define σ˜a(h) =
(
σa(ρ≤r)[1], 
)
. As a consequence of this definition, the
main outcome ρ˜ of σ˜P visits the same sequence of vertices (and even follows the same moves)
as the main outcome ρ of σ; only messages which are broadcast may differ. Thereafter, we
write:
ρ = v0 · (m0,mes0) · v1 · (m1,mes1) · v2 . . . (mr−1,mesr−1) · vr . . .
and, by definition of σ˜P :
ρ˜ = v0 · (m0,mes) · v1 · (m1,mes) · v2 . . . (mr−1,mes) · vr . . .
where ρ˜ = out(σ˜P , v0). Note also that the above definition takes care of single-player
deviations w.r.t. σ˜P which do not ‘leave’ the main outcome (that is, which visit the same
sequence of vertices): against such deviations, simply doing nothing and going on as if no
one deviated will be enough to punish the deviator.
We will now extend the definition ot profile σ˜P to histories generated by single-player
deviations. We will do so by induction, by considering histories that can be derived by
single-player deviations of the so-far-defined profile, and which have become visible.
Let h be a history resulting from a single-player (named d) deviation w.r.t. σ˜P , which
has become visible. It can be decomposed as:
h = v0 · (m¯0, m¯es0) · v1 · (m¯1, m¯es1) . . . vr · (m¯r, m¯esr) · h1
where first(h1) 6= vr+1 (that is, the deviation becomes visible at that point!). Note however
that it may be the case that player d started deviating earlier, but this will not be taken
into account. We remark that, by definition of σ˜P along the main outcome or for invisible
deviations, it is the case that for every 0 ≤ s ≤ r, m¯s(−d) = ms(−d) and m¯ess(−d) =
mes(−d).
With these notations, we can set:
σ˜a(h) = σa
(
h≤r · (m¯r,mes+dr ) · h+d1
)
where mes+dr (d) = idd, mes+dr (−d) = mesr(−d) = , and h+d1 is the same as h1, but each
message of player d is set to idd. In some sense, we tell the players to ignore any deviation as
long as it has not become visible and then treat it as if it were an immediately visible and
honest deviation. Indeed, h≤r · (m′r,mes+dr ) · h+d1 is the history resulting from playing an
immediately visible and honest deviation visiting the same vertices as h.
We argue why this is well-defined. Pick two such deviations, for players d and d′
respectively, which generate histories h = h≤r · (m¯r, m¯esr) · h1 and h′ = h′≤r · (m¯′r, m¯es′r) · h′1
MFCS 2019
14:16 Nash equilibria in games over graphs equipped with a communication mechanism
respectively. We assume a 6= d, d′. It is the case that a cannot distinguish between h
and h′ if and only if pia(h) = pia(h′). By considering the players in the neighbourhood
of d, it is not difficult to get that pia(h) = pia(h′) implies pia(h≤r · (m¯r,mes+dr ) · h+d1 ) =
pia(h′≤r · (m¯′r,mes′r+d) · h′1+d). Hence, this is well-defined.
Now, let ρ′ be the outcome of a d-deviation w.r.t. σ˜P . It can be written as v0 · (m¯0, m¯es0) ·
v1 · (m¯1, m¯es1) . . . vr · (m¯r, m¯esr) · ρ1 (as before). We have that ρ≤r · (m¯r,mes+dr ) · ρ+d1 is the
outcome of an immediately visible and honest d-deviation of σP (since one can check all players
but d play according to σP along the play). Hence, it cannot be profitable to the deviator (by
hypothesis on σP ). Since the two sequences vertices(ρ′) and vertices(ρ≤r · (m¯r,mes+dr ) · ρ+d1 )
coincide, we conclude that ρ′ is not a profitable deviation, and therefore that σ˜P is a Nash
equilibrium. J
A.2 A simple communication pattern is sufficient! Reduction to
normed strategy profiles
In this part, we will show that the richness of the communication offered by the setting is
somehow useless, in that we will show that a very simple communication pattern will be
sufficient for generating Nash equilibria. This pattern consists in reporting the deviator (role
of the direct neighbours of the deviator), and propagating this information (for all the other
players, following the communication graph).
We recall the notion of a normed profile. Let σP be a strategy profile. Let ρ be its main
outcome. The profile σP is said normed whenever the following conditions hold:
1. for every h ∈ out(σP ) ∪
⋃
d∈P , σ′
d
out(σP [d/σ′d], v0), if vertices(h) is a prefix of vertices(ρ),
then for every a ∈ P , σa(h)[2] = ;
2. for every d ∈ P , for every d-strategy σ′d, if h · (m,mes) · v ∈ out(σP [d/σ′d], v0) is the first
step out of vertices(ρ), then for every d_a, σa(h · (m,mes) · v)[2] = idd;
3. for every d ∈ P , for every d-strategy σ′d, if h · (m,mes) · v ∈ out(σP [d/σ′d], v0) has left the
main outcome for more than one step, then for every a ∈ P , σa(h · (m,mes) · v)[2] = 
if for all b_a, mes(b) =  and σa(h · (m,mes) · v)[2] = idd if there is b_a such that
mes(b) = idd; note that this is well defined since at most one id can be transmitted.
The first condition says that, as long as a deviation is not visible, then no message needs to
be sent; the second condition says that as soon as a deviation becomes visible, then messages
denouncing the deviator should be sent by “those who know”, that is, the (immediate)
neighbours of the deviator; the third condition says that the name (actually, the id) of the
deviator should propagate according to the communication graph.
Our first issue is that it can be the case that the deviator can deviate in two distinct
ways (two different actions or messages) but leading to the same sequence of vertices. Those
two deviations should be treated in the same way by the other players. This might in general
not the case, hence we provide a construction to ensure it.
First, let us introduce a new equivalence relation on histories. Given a strategy profile σP
we say that h ≡σP h′ if either h = h′ or writing h = v0·(m0,mes0)·v1...·vs−1·(ms−1,mess−1)·vs
and h′ = v0 · (m′0,mes′0) · v′1... · v′s−1 · (m′s−1,mes′s−1) · v′s, we have:
vertices(h) = vertices(h′);
there is d ∈ P such that h and h′ are both d-deviations w.r.t. σP , and min{l | (ml,mesl) 6=
σP (h≤l)} = min{l | (m′l,mes′l) 6= σP (h′≤l)}.
Essentially both h and h′ leave the main outcome of σP due to a single-player deviation from
the same player, and follow the same sequence of vertices.
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I Lemma 11. Let σP be a strategy profile which is resistant to immediately visible single-
player honest deviations w.r.t. σP . For every history h we define a canonical representative of
the equivalence class of h under ≡σP which we denote by h, with the constraint that whenever
possible h will be generated by playing σP against a single-player deviation (there exists d, τd
and k such that h = out(σP [d/τd], v0)≤k). We define the strategy profile σ′P inductively by
if h = out(σP , v0)≤k for some k, then σ′P (h) = σP (h);
otherwise, if h = out(σ′P [d/τd], v0)≤k for some k, some player d ∈ P and some d-deviation
τd, then:
if d_a, then σ′a(h) = σa(h);
else σ′a(h) = σa(h).
Then, σ′P is a strategy profile which is resistant to immediately visible single-player honest
deviations w.r.t. σ′P , with the same outcome as σP and satisfies if h ≡σ′P h′ then σ′P (h) =
σ′P (h′).
Proof. First we argue why σ′P is well-defined. Consider two histories h and h′ generated
by playing σ′P against single-player deviations with deviators d and d′ respectively, and a
player a such that h ∼a h′. If d_a or d′_a, then, since h ∼a h′, we deduce that d = d′.
Thus, by hypothesis, h = h′, which implies σ′a(h) = σ′a(h′) = σa(h). If d6_a and d′ 6_a, then
σ′a(h) = σa(h) = σa(h′) = σ′a(h′).
It is fairly easy to show by induction that if h ≡σ′P h′ then σ′P (h) = σ′P (h′).
Finally, we explain why σ′P is resistant to immediately visible single-player deviations.
We show by induction that for every k ∈ N, for every deviator d and every d-deviation τd
w.r.t. σ′P there exists a d-deviation τ ′d w.r.t. σP such that vertices(out(σ′P [d/τd], v0)≤k) =
vertices(out(σP [d/τ ′d], v0)≤k).
Hence, since σP is resistant to immediately visible single-player deviations, then so is
σ′P . J
Let us now use this to prove the following result.
I Lemma 12. Assume σP is a strategy profile which is resistant to immediately visible single-
player honest deviations w.r.t. σP and such that, if vertices(h) is a prefix of vertices(out(σP , v0)),
then σP (h)[2] = . Then one can construct a normed strategy profile σ̂ which is resistant
to immediately visible honest single-player deviations, and such that vertices(out(σP , v0)) =
vertices(out(σ̂P , v0)).
Proof. Let σP be a strategy profile which is resistant to immediately visible single-player
honest deviations, with no communication along the main outcome. Furthermore, by usage
of Lemma 11, we can suppose that for all histories h and h′ such that h ≡σP h′, we have
that σP (h) = σP (h′). We will build a profile σ̂P which will be normed and will coincide
in some sense to σP . Let ρ be the main outcome of σP . We analyse immediately visible
deviations from σP at some given step of ρ, say after prefix h0 = ρ≤r, and show that the
undistinguishability relation of deviations from that point is then very simple.
I Lemma 13. Let a be a player, and assume d and d′ are two players such that distG(d, a) > n
and distG(d′, a) > n. Then, for each length-(r + n) immediately visible d-deviation h w.r.t.
σP , after h0, for each length-(r+ n) immediately visible d′-deviation h′ w.r.t. σP , after h0, if
the projection over vertices of h and h′ coincide, then h ∼a h′.
Proof. We do the proof by induction on n.
Case n = 1: We look at one-step deviations after h0, say h = h0 · (m,mes) · v and
h′ = h0 · (m′,mes′) · v (the final vertex v is assumed to be the same, otherwise those two
deviations will for sure be distinguished by every player). Then, the following holds:
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m(−d) = σP (h0)(−d)[1] and mes(−d) = mes(−d);
m′(−d′) = σP (h0)(−d′)[1] and mes′(−d′) = mes(−d′).
The fact that distG(d, a) > n and distG(d′, a) > n means that d6_a and d′ 6_a. Hence,
for every b_a, m(b) = σb(h0)[1] = m′(b) and mes(b) =  = mes′(b). This implies that
pia(h0 · (m,mes) · v) = pia(h0 · (m′,mes′) · v), which means that h ∼a h′. This concludes the
case n = 1.
Inductive step: assume that distG(d, a) > n + 1 and distG(d′, a) > n + 1, and that
h·(m,mes)·v and h′·(m′,mes′)·v are respectively length-(r+n+1) immediately visible d- (resp.
d′-)deviations after h0 w.r.t. σP , which project on the same sequences of vertices. For every
b_a, distG(d, b) > n, hence, by induction hypothesis, h ∼b h′. It implies that σb(h) = σb(h′),
hence m(b) = m′(b) and mes(b) = mes′(b). We deduce that h · (m,mes) ·v ∼a h′ · (m′,mes′) ·v.
This concludes the proof of the inductive step. J
We will now see that this simple undistinguishability relation can be defined using the message
propagation mechanism of normed profiles: a player doesn’t send any message, unless she
receives the id of the deviator from (at least) one neighbour.
We first define normalized versions of immediately visible single-player deviations, and for
this we set η(ρ≤r) = ρ≤r for every integer r. Let now h be an immediately visible and honest
d-deviation w.r.t. σP , which becomes visible right after ρ≤r. We define η(h) inductively as
follows:
If h = ρ≤r · (m,mes) · v, we set η(h) = (ρ≤r · (m,mesd) · v) where mesd(d) = idd and
mesd(−d) = mes(−d);
if h already extends ρ≤r, then η(h · (m,mes) · v) = (η(h) · (m,mes′) · v) where, for every
a ∈ P , mes′(a) =  if for every b_a, m¯es(b) =  and mes′(a) = idd if there is some b_a
such that m¯es(b) = idd, where m¯es is the last message along η(h).
Somehow, η propagates properly messages after a deviation has happened.
Now define profile σ̂P as follows: for every r, set σ̂P (ρ≤r) = σP (ρ≤r). In particular, the
main outcome of σ̂P is ρ. Let now h be an immediately visible and honest d-deviation w.r.t.
σP , after ρ≤r; we set for every a ∈ P :
if |h| ≥ distG(d, a)− r, we set σ̂a(η(h)) = (σa(h)[1], idd);
if |h| < distG(d, a)− r, we set σ̂a(η(h)) = (σa(h)[1], ).
We argue why σ̂P is defined everywhere it should be defined. For that we show that every
immediately visible single-player deviation of σ̂P is the image by η of some immediately
visible single-player deviation of σP . This can easily be done by induction on the length of
the deviation.
We then notice that, by construction, σ̂P propagates messages properly. We finally argue
below why σ̂P is well-defined.
Assume that h and h′ are two histories generated by immediately visible d- (resp. d′-
)deviations w.r.t. σ̂P such that η(h) ∼a η(h′) but such that h 6∼a h′. From Lemma 13, we
deduce that distG(d, a) < r + n or distG(d′, a) < r + n where h and h′ become visible at
step r + 1 and are of length r + n (we know they are of the same length, become visible
on the same step and that vertices(h) = vertices(h′) from η(h) ∼a η(h′)). This means in
turns thanks to the construction of σ̂P that player a received message idd at some step along
η(h) or signal idd′ at some step along η(h′). Hence we have d = d′ and player a received
message idd at the same step along both η(h) and η(h′) since otherwise, she would be able to
tell the difference between them. Thus, h and h′ are generated by playing two d-deviations
visiting the same vertices and deviating from the main outcome at the same time. Hence, we
have that h ≡σP h′, which means from our hypothesis on σP that σP (h) = σP (h′), thus σ̂P is
well-defined.
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Now we prove that σ̂P is resistant to immediately visible single-player deviations. Toward
a contradiction, assume there is a profitable immediately visible d-deviation. As noticed
above, this deviation is the image by η of some immediately visible d-deviation w.r.t. σP .
Since η preserves the sequences of vertices, this deviation is profitable as well. This is not
possible, by assumption on σP , hence σ̂P is resistant to immediately visible single-player
deviations. J
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
I Theorem 4. The existence of a Nash equilibrium σP with payoff p is equivalent to the
existence of a normed strategy profile σ′P with payoff p, which is resistant to immediately
visible and honest single-player deviations.
Proof. Assume σP is a Nash equilibrium with payoff p. It is in particular resistant to
immediately visible single-player honest single-player deviations. Applying Lemma 10, σP
can be turned to a profile σ˜P satisfying the hypotheses of Lemma 13, and having payoff p.
Applying Lemma 13, there is another profile σ̂P , which is normed and resistant to immediately
visible single-player deviations, and such that its main outcome visits the same sequence of
vertices as the main outcome of σP . In particular, it has payoff p.
Assume that σP is a normed strategy profile, which is resistant to immediately visible
and honest single-player deviations, and which has payoff p. Thanks to Lemma 10, one can
construct a Nash equilibrium σ˜P , whose main outcome visits the same sequence of vertices
as the main outcome of σP , hence its payoff is p as well. J
B Correctness of the epistemic game construction
In this section, we let G be a concurrent game, G be a communication graph for the players
of G, and we let EGG be the corresponding epistemic game. We assume all previous notations.
We write ID = {idd | d ∈ P} and ID = ID ∪ {}.
B.1 Basic properties of the epistemic game
Considering an EGG -history H = (v0, X0), (v0, X0, f0)...(vk, Xk) (notice we always have perfect
alternation between Eve’s states and Adam’s state), we write visited(H) for v0...vk ∈ V ∗. We
denote by HistEGG (v0, X0) the set of such histories. An important result that will be useful
later is the following:
I Lemma 14. If (v,X) is an Eve’s state reachable from some (v0, ∅) in EGG , then for all
d ∈ dev(X):
for all a ∈ IXd , KXd (a) = {d};
for all a /∈ IXd , KXd (a) = dev(X) \ {d′ ∈ dev(X) | a ∈ IXd′ }.
In particular, for all d, d′ ∈ dev(X), for all a /∈ IXd ∪ IXd′ , KXd (a) = KXd′ (a).
Proof. A proof by induction follows immediately from the structure of the epistemic game. J
B.2 From Eve’s strategies in EGG to normed profiles in G
We fix a strategy ζ for Eve, associating to every possible EGG -history a certain Eve’s ac-
tion. From ζ, one defines inductively (on the size of histories) a partial function Eζ :⋃
a∈P HistG,a(v0)→ HistEGG (v0, ∅) associating a EGG -history to some a-history h in the original
game such that if (m,mes) · v is a suffix of h, then
MFCS 2019
14:20 Nash equilibria in games over graphs equipped with a communication mechanism
(i) for every b ∈ n(a), mes(b) ∈ ID;
(ii) for every b, c ∈ n(a), mes(b) 6= mes(c) implies mes(b) =  or mes(c) = ; for every
b ∈ n(a), if the message sent by b earlier along h is idd for some d ∈ P , then mes(b) = idd;
(iii) last(Eζ(h)) = (v,X), with the following additional properties:
X = ∅ implies for each b ∈ n(a), mes(b) = ;
if there is b ∈ n(a) with mes(b) = idd, then d ∈ dev(X) and a ∈ IXd ;
if X 6= ∅ and for every b ∈ n(a), mes(b) = , then there exists c ∈ dev(X) such that
a /∈ IXc ;
We write (‡) those conditions.
Together with this partial function Eζ , we define a strategy profile σP in G, which will in
some sense (that we will explicit later) correspond to ζ.
For history v0 ∈ HistG,a(v0), we abusively assume that the last message (denoted mes)
assigns  to every player in n(a) (that is, mes(n(a)) = mes(n(a))). All conditions (‡) are
then immediately satisfied and we define Eζ(v0) = (v0, ∅).
Pick now a history h ∈ HistG,a(v0), ending with (m,mes) · v, such that Eζ(h) is well-
defined (induction hypothesis). Notice this implies that h satisfies all conditions (‡). Writing
last(Eζ(h)) = (v,X), we will define σa(h), and extend Eζ to several extensions of h. We
distinguish several cases:
Assume first that X = ∅. Then, ζ(Eζ(h)) ∈ ActP . We set σa(h) =
(
ζ(Eζ(h))(a), 
)
.
We extend Eζ as follows.
First, if all players follow the suggestion of Eve (that is, do not deviate), then the next
state will be v′ = Tab
(
v, ζ(Eζ(h))
)
. In this case, no message should be broadcast, and
in EGG (under Eζ), Adam complies with the suggestion of Eve and goes to (v′, ∅):
Eζ
(
h · pia
(
ζ(Eζ(h)),mes
) · v′) = Eζ(h) · ((v, ∅), ζ(Eζ(h))) · (v′, ∅)
Else, for every d ∈ P and δ ∈ Act, writing v′ = Tab(v, ζ(Eζ(h))[d/δ]) and assuming
that v′ = Tab
(
v, ζ(Eζ(h))
)
(which means it is an invisible deviation), no message
should be broadcast as well since the deviation is somehow harmless, and in EGG (under
Eζ), Adam complies with the suggestion of Eve and goes to (v′, ∅):
Eζ
(
h · pia
(
ζ(Eζ(h))[d/δ],mesd
) · v′) = Eζ(h) · ((v, ∅), ζ(Eζ(h))) · (v′, ∅)
where mesd(d) = idd and mesd(−d) = mes(−d).
Finally, for every d ∈ P and δ ∈ Act, writing v′ = Tab(v, ζ(Eζ(h))[d/δ]) and as-
suming that v′ 6= Tab(v, ζ(Eζ(h))) (which means it is a visible deviation), and
X ′ = upd((v, ∅), ζ(Eζ(h)), v′) (which is then defined and nonempty):
Eζ
(
h · pia
(
ζ(Eζ(h))[d/δ],mesd
) · v′) = Eζ(h) · ((v, ∅), ζ(Eζ(h))) · (v′, X ′)
where mesd(d) = idd and mesd(−d) = mes(−d).
Note that in all cases, the expected conditions are satisfied.
Assume that X 6= ∅. If there is b ∈ n(a) such that mes(b) 6= , then pick d ∈ dev(X) such
that mes(b) = idd; otherwise pick any d ∈ dev(X) such that a /∈ IXd (it must exist as well
by induction hypothesis). We let m = ζ(Eζ(h))(d), and we set:
σa(h) =
{
(m(a), idd) if there is b ∈ n(a) s.t. mes(b) = idd,
(m(a), ) otherwise.
In the first case, player a has received the message blaming player d, the deviator, while
in the second case player a has received no message.
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This is well-defined for two different reasons: (i) those two cases can be distinguished
in h thanks to the messages pia(mes) = mes(n(a)); (ii) in the second case, thanks to
Lemma 5 and to the definition of actions in the epistemic game, the value ζ(Eζ(h))(d)(a)
is independent of the choice of d ∈ dev(X) satisfying a /∈ IXd .
We furthermore extend Eζ as follows.
For every δ ∈ Act, writing v′ = Tab(v,m[d/δ]), and X ′ = upd((v,X), ζ(Eζ(h)), v′)
(which is then defined and nonempty):
Eζ
(
h · pia(m[d/δ],mes′) · v′
)
= Eζ(h) · ((v,X), ζ(Eζ(h))) · (v′, X ′)
with mes′(b) = idd if b ∈ IXd and mes′(b) =  otherwise.
Note that all conditions of the induction hypothesis are satisfied.
Note that (‡) are satisfied by every h such that Eζ(h) is defined.
This allows to define a function Ω associating a strategy profile in the original game to
every Eve’s strategy in the epistemic game.
Pick ζ an Eve’s strategy in the epistemic game. Let σ = Ω(ζ) be the strategy profile in
the original game we have just constructed, together with the partial function Eζ . We show
the following lemma:
I Lemma 15. Profile σ is normed.
Let ρ be the main outcome of profile σ. Then, taking Eζ at the limit, for every player
a ∈ P , Eζ(pia(ρ)) is well-defined, and equal to R, the unique outcome of ζ where Adam
complies to Eve’s suggestions. In particular, Eζ(pia(ρ)) is independent of the choice of
player a ∈ P .
Consider a honest and immediately visible single-player deviation, and let ρ′ be the
corresponding outcome. Then, taking Eζ at the limit, for every a ∈ P , Eζ(pia(ρ′)) is
well-defined, and equal to R′, an outcome of ζ, where Adam does not comply to Eve’s
suggestions. In particular, R′ 6= R.
Proof. Let R = (v0, ∅) · ((v0, ∅), f0) · (v1, ∅) . . . (vs, ∅) . . . be the outcome of ζ, where Adam
complies to Eve’s suggestion. For every r ≥ 0, fr ∈ ActP . We let ρ = v0 · (f0,mes) ·
v1 . . . (fs−1,mes) · vs . . . . We can show (but omit it, since it is obvious) by induction on s
that (i) for every a, Eζ(pia(v0 · (f0,mes) · v1 . . . (fs−1,mes) · vs)) is defined, and is equal to
(v0, ∅) · ((v0, ∅), f0) · (v1, ∅) . . . (vs, ∅), the prefix of length s of R; and (ii) σa(v0 · (f0,mes) ·
v1 . . . (fs−1,mes) · vs) = ((fs)a, ). In particular, the unique outcome of profile σ is ρ, and
messages are handled correctly by σ on that part.
Then, notice that single-player deviations that do follow the sequence of vertices of the
main outcome of σ are considered as non-deviations by σ (by construction, second item of
the case X = ∅).
Pick a ‘honest and visible’ deviation σ′d for player d. We show that messages propagate
properly, and that the outcome of σ[d/σ′d] corresponds to an outcome of ζ, distinct from
the main outcome, where Adam complies to Eve’s suggestions. We write ρ′ = v′0 · (f ′0,mes′0) ·
v′1 . . . (f ′s−1,mes′s−1)·v′s . . . for the outcome of σ[d/σ′d]. There exists s such that v0 ·(f0,mes)·
v1 . . . (fs−1,mes) ·vs = v′0 · (f ′0,mes′0) ·v′1 . . . (f ′s−1,mes′s−1) ·v′s, v′s+1 6= vs+1 and f ′s = fs[d/δ]
for some action δ, while mes′s(d) = idd and mes′s(a) =  if a 6= d (this is by definition of
a honest and visible deviation). So far, the message propagation system is working well.
For every r ≥ s+ 1, we write h′r for the prefix of length r of ρ′. We show by induction on
r ≥ s+1 that for every a, Eζ(pia(h′r)) is well-defined and equal to R′r, with last(R′r) = (v′r, X ′r)
(X ′r 6= ∅), R′r is an outcome of ζ, and the message propagation system has been working
properly along h′r.
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By construction of partial function Eζ , for every a, Eζ(pia(h′s+1)) is well-defined, and
is equal to R′s+1 = (v0, ∅) · ((v0, ∅), f0) · (v1, ∅) . . . (vs, ∅) · ((vs, ∅), fs+1) · (v′s+1, X ′s+1),
where X ′s+1 = upd((vs, ∅), fs+1, v′s+1) (with X ′s+1 6= ∅). Obviously, R′s+1 is a prefix of an
outcome of ζ. So far, the message propagating system has worked well along h′s+1.
We assume that for every a, Eζ(pia(h′r)) (with r ≥ s+ 1) is well-defined and equal to R′r,
with last(R′r) = (v′r, X ′r) (X ′r 6= ∅). We also assume that R′r is (a prefix of) an outcome of
ζ. Finally we assume that the message propagation system has worked properly along h′r.
We show that the same properties hold for h′r+1. We fix a player a. Since Eζ(pia(h′r)) = R′r,
we have that X ′r and mes′r−1 satisfy the conditions (‡) given on page 20.
To do the inductive step, we first look at σa(h′r):
σa(h′r) =

((
ζ(Eζ(pia(h′r)))(d)
)
a
, idd
)
if there is b ∈ n(a) s.t. mes′r−1(b) 6= ((
ζ(Eζ(pia(h′r)))(d)
)
a
, 
)
otherwise
Hence, in all cases, we have σa(h′r)[1] =
(
ζ(Eζ(pia(h′r)))(d)
)
a
=
(
ζ(R′r)(d)
)
a
, and messages
are properly propagated by player a. We write m′ = ζ(R′r)(d), and define the message
mes′r by mes′r(a) = idd if there is b ∈ n(a) such that mes′r−1(b) = idd, and mes′r(a) = 
otherwise. Now, there is an action δ ∈ Act such that
h′r+1 = h′r · (m′[d/δ],mes′r) · v′r+1
We define
R′r+1 = R′r · ((v′r, X ′r), ζ(R′r)) · (v′r+1, X ′r+1)
with X ′r+1 = upd((v′r, X), ζ(R′r), v′r+1). Note that X ′r+1 is well-defined and nonempty
since this is witnessed by Tab(v′r,
(
ζ(R′r)(d)
)
[d/a]) = v′r+1. By construction of Eζ , we
have that Eζ(pia(h′r+1)) is well-defined and equal to R′r+1. Finally, along h′r+1, the
communication system has been working properly, and R′r+1 is obviously (a prefix of) an
outcome of ζ (distinct from R). This concludes the proof of the inductive step, and of
the lemma.
J
The following statement is an obvious consequence of the construction of Eζ :
I Lemma 16. If ζ is a winning strategy for Eve in EGG , then σ = Ω(ζ) is a normed strategy
profile, which is resistant to single-player visible and honest deviations, and whose payoff is
equal to the payoff of the outcome of ζ where Adam complies to Eve’s suggestions.
Proof. We assume that ζ is a winning strategy for Eve, and that the payoff of the main
outcome R of ζ is p = (pa)a∈P . Then, for each other outcome of ζ, the payoff is bounded by
p.
Applying Lemma 15, the main outcome ρ of σ is such that Eζ(ρ) = R, yielding payoff p
for ρ. Pick a honest and visible d-deviation σ′d, and let ρ′ be the outcome of σ[d/σ′d]. Then,
Eζ(ρ′) is defined and is an outcome of ζ (again by application of Lemma 15), which payoff is
therefore bounded by p. Hence, σ satisfies the expected conditions. J
B.3 From normed profiles in G to Eve’s strategies in EGG
We assume an arbitrary total order < on the set Act. This will be used to define unique
corresponding (local) histories in G.
We first define a mapping assigning families of (local) histories in G to histories in EGG .
Consider an Eve’s history H = (v0, X0) · (v0, X0, f0) . . . (vs, Xs) in EGG .
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If Xs = ∅, then for every r < s, Xr = ∅ as well, and therefore fr ∈ ActP . We then
associate with H the single full history, which is easily seen to be well-defined:
h = v0 · (f0,mes) · v1 · (f1,mes) · v2 . . . (fs−1,mes) · vs
If Xs 6= ∅, then there is a smallest index 0 < r0 ≤ s such that Xr0 6= ∅, and for every
r0 ≤ r ≤ s, Xr 6= ∅. Note also that for every r0 ≤ r1 ≤ r2 ≤ s, dev(Xr2) ⊆ dev(Xr1). We
then associate with H and with every deviator d ∈ dev(Xs), the (unique) full history:
hd = v0 · (m0,mes0) · v1 . . . (ms−1,mess1) · vs
such that:
l < r0 implies ml = fl and mesl = mes;
Let l ≥ r0. For every a ∈ P , mesl(a) = idd if a ∈ IXld , otherwise mesl(a) = .
Then, ml(−d) = fl(d)(−d), and ml(d) is the <-smallest action δ ∈ Act such that
vl+1 = Tab(vl, fl(d)[d/δ]).
We denote by Λ the function that associates with every Eve’s history H in EGG , either the
single full history h (first case), or the family of full histories (hd)d∈dev(Xs) (second case).
Let σ be a normed strategy profile in the original game. We define the Eve’s strategy ζ
as follows:
if H is such that last(H) = (v, ∅), then ζ(H) ∈ ActP and ζ(H)(a) = σa(Λ(H))[1];
if H is such that last(H) = (v,X) with X 6= ∅, then ζ(H) : dev(X)→ ActP is such that
ζ(H)(d)(a) = σa(Λ(H)(d))[1] for all d ∈ dev(X).
This allows to define a function Υ associating a strategy in the epistemic game to every
normed profile in the original game.
Pick σ a normed strategy profile in G, and write ζ = Υ(σ) for the corresponding strategy
in EGG .
I Lemma 17. Let R be the unique outcome of ζ where Adam complies to Eve’s suggestions.
Then, at the limit, Λ(R) is the unique outcome ρ of profile σ.
Let R′ be an outcome of ζ along which Adam does not always comply to Eve’s suggestions.
Then, for every d ∈ lims→+∞ dev(X ′s), there exists some honest and visible deviation σ′d
such that Λ(R′)(d) = out(σ[d/σ′d], v0).
Proof. Write R = (v0, ∅) · ((v0, ∅), f0) · (v1, ∅) · ((v1, ∅), f1) · (v2, ∅) . . . for the outcome of ζ,
along which Adam complies to Eve’s suggestions. Then it is easy to argue that the outcome
of σ is ρ = v0 · (f0,mes) · v1 · (f1,mes) · v2 . . . , and ρ coincides with Λ(R) (at the limit).
Let R′ = (v′0, X ′0) · ((v′0, X ′0), f ′0) · (v′1, X ′1) . . . such that there is some (the first) r such
that X ′r 6= ∅. We show by induction on s ≥ r that for every d ∈ dev(X ′s), there is a honest
d-deviation σ′d such that the length-s outcome of σ[d/σ′d] is
v′0 · (f ′0,mes0) · v′1 · (f ′1,mes1) · v′2 . . . (f ′s−1,mess−1) · v′s = Λ(R′≤s)(d)
In the same induction, we will prove that IX
′
s
d = {a ∈ P | ∃b ∈ n(a) s.t. mess−1(b) = idd}.
Before proving the induction, notice that v′0 · (f ′0,mes0) · v′1 · (f ′1,mes1) . . . v′r−1 = v0 ·
(f0,mes) · v1 · (f1,mes) . . . vr−1 (that is, it follows the main outcome), and v′r 6= vr.
Assume s = r. Then, X ′r = upd((vr−1, ∅), ζ(R≤r−1), v′r) (defined and nonempty), with
ζ(R≤r−1)(a) = σa(ρ≤r−1)[1]. By construction, for every d ∈ dev(X ′r), there is δ ∈ Act
such that v′r = Tab(vr−1, σ(ρ≤r−1)[d/δ]), where σ(ρ≤r−1) denotes abusively the tuple
(σa(ρ≤r−1)[1])a∈P . We define σ′d(ρ≤r−1) = (δ, idd) (this is a honest and visible deviation).
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Then, ρ≤r ∈ out(σ[d/σ′d], v0). Also, since the system of message propagation under σ is
behaving well, it is the case that for every a, mess−1(a) =  if a 6= d, and mess−1(d) = idd
(as given by σ′d(ρ≤r−1)). It is an easy check to prove the property on messages.
Assume we have proven the result at rank s, and consider R′≤s+1 = R′≤s · ((v′s, X ′s), f ′s) ·
(v′s+1, X ′s+1). Pick d ∈ dev(X ′s+1). Since then, d ∈ dev(X ′s) as well, we can apply the
induction hypothesis to R′≤s, and we have a deviation σ′d such that the length-s outcome
of σ[d/σ′d] is Λ(R′≤s)(d).
By definition, X ′s+1 = upd((v′s, X ′s), f ′s, v′s+1), hence there exists δ ∈ Act such that
Tab(v′s, f ′s(d)[d/δ]) = v′s+1. We then define σ′d(Λ(R′≤s)d) = (δ, idd). The length-(s + 1)
outcome of σ[d/σ′d] is
Λ(R′≤s)(d) · (m[d/δ],mes) · v′
where:
for every a ∈ P , m(a) = σa(Λ(R′≤s)(d))[1]
for every a ∈ P , mes(a) = σa(Λ(R′≤s)(d))[2]
v′ = Tab(v′s,m[d/δ])
Now, we show m[d/δ] = f ′s(d): f ′s(d)(a) = (ζ(R′≤s)(d))(a) = σa(Λ(R′≤s)(d)[1] = m(a).
Hence, v′ = v′s+1. We conclude that the length-(s+ 1) outcome of σ[d/σ′d] is
Λ(R′≤s)(d) · (ζ(R′≤s)(d)[d/δ],mes) · v′s+1 = Λ(R′≤s+1)(d)
Concerning the messages: IX
′
s+1
d = {a ∈ P | ∃b ∈ IX
′
s
d s.t. distG(a, b) ≤ 1}. Since d is the
deviator and the deviation is honest, mess−1(d) = mess(d) = idd, and for every a 6= d,
mess(a) = mes(a) = σa(Λ(R′≤s)(d))[2]. Since σ is normed, messages are propagated
correctly by all players a 6= d. Hence the expected equality holds.
J
I Lemma 18. If σ is a normed strategy profile in G, which is resistant to single-player
immediately visible and honest deviations, then ζ = Υ(σ) is a winning strategy in EGG .
Proof. Let p be the payoff associated with ρ = out(σ, v0). The outcome of ζ when Adam
complies to Eve’s suggestions is R such that ρ = Λ(R). In particular, R has the same payoff
as ρ, that is, p.
Assume now that R′ = (v0, X0) · ((v0, X0), f0) · (v1, X1) . . . is a play in the epistemic game
such that from some point on, Xi 6= ∅. Then, from Lemma 17, for every d ∈ lims→+∞ dev(X ′s),
there exists σ′d such that
ρ′ = out(σ[d/σ′d], v0) = Λ(R′)(d)
The payoff of ρ′ and R′ therefore coincide (and are equal to p′). Since σ is a Nash equilibrium,
p′d ≤ pd. Hence for every d ∈ lims→+∞ dev(X ′s), the payoff of player d along R′ is bounded
by pd. Hence ζ is winning. J
B.4 Conclusion
As a consequence of Theorem 4, Lemmas 16 and 18, we get Theorem 7:
I Theorem 7. There is a Nash equilibrium with payoff p in G if and only if there is a
winning strategy for Eve in EGG for payoff p.
Note that all the results are constructive, hence if one can synthesize a winning strategy
for Eve in EGG , then we can synthesize a correponding Nash equilibrium in G.
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C Complexity analysis
By application of Lemma 5, we get:
I Lemma 19. Let (v, ∅) · ((v, ∅), f0) · (v1, X1) · ((v1, X1), f1) · (v2, X2) . . . with X1 6= ∅ be a
history in EGG . Then for every r ≥ 1:
dev(Xr) ⊆ dev(X1);
for every d ∈ dev(Xr), for every a ∈ P , distG(d, a) ≤ r iff a ∈ IXrd .
If d ∈ dev(Xr) and distG(d, a) ≤ r, then KXrd (a) = {d}.
If d ∈ dev(Xr) and distG(d, a) > r, then KXrd (a) = dev(Xr)\{d′ ∈ dev(Xr) | distG(d′, a) ≤
r}.
I Lemma 20. Assuming that Tab is given explicitely in G, the number of states in the
reachable part of EGG from sinit = (vinit, ∅) is bounded by
|SEve| ≤ |V |+ |V | · |Tab|2 · (diam(G) + 2) and |SAdam| ≤ |SEve| · |Act||P |2
The number of edges is bounded by |SAdam|+ |SAdam| · |SEve|.
If |P | is assumed to be a constant of the problem, then the size of EGG is polynomial in the
size of G.
Proof. We start by evaluating the number of Eve’s states. First, the number of Eve’s states
(v, ∅) is obviously |V |.
Then, pick an Eve state (v′, X ′) with X ′ 6= ∅, such that there is a transition ((v, ∅), f)→
(v′, X ′) in EGG (those are immediate visible deviations). Then, following an argument used
in [4, Prop. 4.8], we can show that |Tab| ≥ 2|dev(X′)|: indeed, each player in dev(X ′) has been
able to deviate, hence can at least do two actions from the current state, yielding the claimed
bound.
We will now analyze the part which is reachable from (v′, X ′). Applying Lemma 19, any
Eve’s state (v′′, X ′′) reachable from (v′, X ′) is such that dev(X ′′) ⊆ dev(X ′), and is fully
characterized by (v′, dev(X ′′), r) where dev(X ′′) ⊆ dev(X ′) and r is the distance from (v′, X ′).
Hence, this number of states is bounded by |V | ·2|dev(X′)| ·(diam(G)+2), where diam(G) is the
maximal diameter of the connected components of G (the +2 term is for “distance +∞” and
for “distance larger than the diameter”). Hence it is bounded by |V | · |Tab| · (diam(G) + 2).
Since there are at most |Tab| possible deviation starting points (v′, X ′), the number of
Eve’s states is bounded by |V |+ |V | · |Tab|2 · (diam(G) + 2).
Now we evaluate the number of Adam’s states. There are at most |Tab| states of the form
((v, ∅), f). Now, from an Eve’s state (v,X) with X 6= ∅, there are Adam’s states ((v,X), f)
with f : dev(X) → ActP . It is a priori difficult to reduce the number of such f , which is
bounded by |Act||dev(X)|·|P |, hence by |Act||P |2 . J
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